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1.

Introduction
An extensive literature studying financial barriers to homeownership has developed over

the past two decades. This line of research provides ample evidence that down payment and
monthly payment requirements, which respectively depend on the household’s wealth and
income, traditionally have been a factor in tenure status. The research also documents the
impact of borrowers’ credit quality, a determinant of access to mortgage credit, on tenure
status. A second line of research, theoretical and empirical, demonstrates both that loosened
mortgage underwriting helped fuel the boom in house prices between 2003 and 2007and the
boom in house prices supported the credit expansion.
What the literature does not identify is the effect of this credit expansion on borrowing
constraints, and the effect of changing borrowing constraints on homeownership. In fact,
homeownership did not expand after 2004 despite the expansion of credit supply and
loosening of traditional credit constraints. Our paper contributes to the literature by being the
first to measure the changes in borrowing constraints during the 2003 to 2007 period of
rapidly rising house values, and the associated impacts on homeownership. We also consider
the relationship of changing borrowing constraints to regional house price appreciation. 5
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) which is
comprised of households headed by persons in their 40s, excluding immigrants. As a
relatively homogeneous demographic group, these households provide a controlled sample
for studying the impact of the evolving housing and credit environment. The survey provides
information on the homeownership status and current house values, as well as income, wealth
and credit quality of households that allows us to identify those that face potential income,
wealth or credit constraints. Within this sample, we focus on households that have recently
moved, because these households face an actual tenure choice decision. The timing of the
survey provides two important snapshots bounding the boom period: we use the 2004 and
2008 data which reflects tenure choices among households that moved during 2002-2003 and
2006-2007, respectively.
Consistent with prior studies, the three constraint categories of income, wealth, and credit
history are found to be associated with reduced likelihood of homeownership among the
recent movers in the first wave of the survey. Importantly, however, although the pool of
financially constrained households increased during the boom period, as reflected in

5

See “Explaining the Housing Bubble” (Levitin and Wachter, 2012) for a discussion of the timing of
the housing bubble as it relates to real estate fundamentals in particular as it relates to rents and interest
rates.
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comparison across the two snapshots, the marginal impact of borrowing constraints, other
than the wealth constraint, declined.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the relevant literature,
section three discusses the data, and section four outlines the methodology. Section five
discusses the results, and section six concludes.

2.

Literature Review
As noted, our paper builds on the well-established literature that documents a significant

role of borrowing constraints as a factor in homeownership status, especially among lowincome and minority households. For instance, Haurin et al. (1996, 1997) demonstrates that
the wealth constraint plays an important role, even after taking into account the endogeneity
of wealth in tenure decisions.6
The earlier literature examines wealth and income constraints but does not consider the
role of borrowing constraints tied to household credit quality. Rosenthal (2002) introduces
credit quality in investigating barriers to homeownership by considering the combined impact
of all three types of borrowing constraints using the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finance.
Barakova et al. (2003) confirms the importance of credit quality and evaluates the relative
impact of credit quality on homeownership rates, distinguishing it from wealth and income
constraints. The current study extends Calem et al. (2010), which uses information on
wealth, income, and credit in the 2004 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY) to demonstrate the effect of wealth, income and credit constraints in accessing
homeownership status.
This paper also relates to the recent and expanding literature that considers the
relationship of collateral values to house price dynamics. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2009)
argue that less restrictive underwriting standards prior to the mortgage crisis could have been
detected but were masked by rapid house-price appreciation. Pavlov and Wachter (2011)
investigate the relationship between riskier, mortgage lending instruments with less restrictive
underwriting standards and asset market prices and find that the expansion of credit supply
through these instruments increases asset prices and magnifies the effects of demand shocks.
Like Pavlov and Wachter (2011), Adelino et al. (2011) agree that higher credit supply
induces an increase in asset prices. In particular, they reject the notion that an increase in
housing demand loosens financial constraints. On the other hand, Brueckner et al. (2012) find
6

The study arrived at similar findings with and without endogenizing wealth. Similarly, Calem,
Firestone, and Wachter (2010) consider potential endogeneity of wealth and income in a study of the
impact of financing constraints using NLSY data, and determine the findings to be robust to using
instruments.
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feedback effects between expectations of rising house prices and less restrictive mortgage
underwriting. Coleman et al. (2008) also find that the expansion of credit is a result of the rise
in house prices during the boom period.
Another line of investigation uses structural vector error correction models to determine
whether mortgage expansion Granger-causes price rises or whether price rises Grangercauses an expansion in mortgage credit in the US and elsewhere. The findings generally
support bidirectional causality. (See Anundsen & Jansen 2012; Berlinghieri, 2010; Oikarinen,
2009a; Oikarinen, 2009b; Sophocles & Vlassopoulos, 2009; Fitzpatrick & McQuinn, 2007;
Gerlach & Peng, 2005; Gimeno & Martinez-Carrascal, 2010; Hoffman, 2004; Hoffman,
2003.)
A related question the literature addresses is whether the rise in house prices is associated
with greater reliance on risk-based pricing allowing for lower credit scores, and low- or nodocumentation (low-, no-doc) mortgages (see Getter, 2011). The argument is that when
collateral (house) values are rising, lenders do not need to verify income to underwrite a loan
but rather can rely primarily on credit scores and price the loan according to the riskiness of
the borrower. Based on this analysis, wealth, income and credit constraints reduce the
probability of homeownership when house prices do not increase, but when they do increase,
risk-based pricing (with the assumption that house values will continue to rise) makes these
constraints non-binding.7 Our empirical tests allow us to identify whether this applies
generally and also for each constraint, separately.
Our paper contributes to both the literature on financing constraints and the research on
linkages between credit supply and house prices during the boom. First, the paper documents
the impact of the change in borrowing constraints on homeownership in this unusual period.
Second, quantifying the impact of borrowing constraints during the boom period helps
explain the linkages between credit supply and collateral values.

3.

Data
We use data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) to study the

7

This is consistent with practices documented in the Federal Reserve interagency guidance on
Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks (Sept. 29, 2006), Final Rule amending Regulation Z (July 14,
2008).The result, according to Getter (2011), is that no-doc lending makes it possible to follow a lifecycle consumption pattern where income is no longer tied to consumption, consistent with the
literature on credit constraints to consumption (Zeldes, 1989; Campbell and Cocco, 2003). This
possible relationship between house borrowing constraints and consumer welfare outcome is discussed
in theoretical general equilibrium models (see Favilukis et al., 2010); see also “Why Housing” (Levitin
and Wachter, 2013) for another perspective on this argument.
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interaction between borrowing constraints and house price dynamics in determining whether
households become homeowners. This survey is conducted every other year across a fixed
sample of households. A set of sampling weights is provided (and which we utilize) to adjust
for attrition of the sample over time.
We use the 2004 and 2008 waves of the NLSY, which bound the housing boom period of
2004 through 2007 with individual variables described in Table 1. In particular, the 2004 data
reflect home purchases mostly in 2002 and 2003, preceding the period of rapid acceleration in
home values and expanded availability of nontraditional mortgage products, and the 2008
data reflect purchases mostly in 2006 and 2007, when the use of nontraditional mortgage
products and home values peaked.
There are several advantages to using these data in addition to its relevant timing. First,
the survey has information for the three major borrowing constraint categories—income,
wealth, and credit—for both periods.8 Second, the data identify participants that have moved
since the prior survey, enabling us to focus on recent movers. Focusing on recent movers
mitigates concerns about mismatch between current households’ financial condition and
original tenure choice. Moreover, recent movers are of particular relevance because these
households recently faced an actual tenure choice decision.9 In other words, the tenure status
of some non-movers may not reflect their current preferences, but they remain in their current
status because of transactions costs.
Obviously, the NLSY79 sample is representative only of a specific generational cohort
(individuals mostly between 40 and 50 years of age), not of all U.S. households. We do not
view this as a significant drawback because our focus is on the evolving impact of borrowing
constraints over the boom period, which we expect would be similar for other demographic
groups. Indeed, it can be viewed as an advantage to the extent that it allows for such analysis
within a relatively controlled sample.10
8

Wealth is defined by the NLSY as net worth—the difference between families’ gross assets (Home
Value, Car Value, Cash Saving, IRAs, 401Ks, CDs, Stocks/Bonds, Trusts, Business Assets) and their
liabilities (Mortgage, Property Debt, Business Debt, Car Debt, Other Debt). The data includes an
aggregate net worth field (cleaned and imputed for missing records), which is what we use but also
construct wealth from the individual assets and liabilities similar to Calem et al (2010). For a full
listing of assets and liabilities and imputations,
see https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/other-documentation/codebook-supplement.
9
Even though the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth collects panel data, this is not a panel data
study. A third of the observations are repeat movers in both years. With only a third of the
observations occurring in both years, the sample sizes are much reduced, which will reduce the power
of any test. Making use of the panel aspect of repeat moves would entail major complications, such as
potential endogeneity of the repeat move choice.
10
An alternative data source for our question is the Survey of Consumer Finances, but the survey does
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Table 2 shows summary statistics for the two samples of recent movers, labeled 2003 and
2007, respectively. We have 1,962 individuals who changed their residence in 2003 and
1,591 individuals who did so in 2007. The mean age is 43 in 2003 and 46 in 2007 for both the
full sample and the owners and renters groups (where owning and renting reflect tenure status
after the move). A somewhat larger portion is choosing to reside in an MSA (post-move) in
2007 compared to 2003, which is true both for owners and renters. Fewer are married and
have children in the 2007 recent mover group than in the 2003 recent mover group. Family
log income does not change significantly between 2003 and 2007. Renters in both years have
lower wealth and somewhat lower income than owners. Mean house value is unchanged
between 2003 and 2007.
In these recent mover samples, the homeownership rate decreases from 47 to 39 percent
between 2003 and 2007.11 This drop in homeownership for recent movers in the NLSY is
consistent with the national trends reported by the U.S. Census, which show declining
homeownership since 2004, as shown in Figure 1. In particular, the Census reports a national
decrease in homeownership for ages 40-49 from 69% to 67%.
Table 2 also provides the same set of summary statistics for the full survey data of over
7,000 observations in both years. The statistics are similar to those reported for the recent
mover samples, but non-movers are more likely to be married, to have children at home, to
have a larger family size and higher average house value and wealth.
Two measures of local housing market conditions are used in this study. We measure
local house price appreciation rates using the FHFA all-transactions house price index at the
MSA level, or the index for the non-MSA part of the states for households residing outside
MSAs.12 We also use a value-to-rent ratio based on American Community Survey median
house value and median gross rent for the MSA or state in which the respondent resides.
Figure 2 shows the aggregate change in house prices from 2000 to 2007. Comparison to
Figure 1 indicates that homeownership rates peaked in 2004 before house prices peaked in

not identify location of households. We do however use the SCF data to replicate our tests to the
extent possible. Similarly, the American Housing Survey contains representative homeownership data
but lacks information on wealth.
11
The aging of the NLSY population is unlikely a factor influencing this decline in the homeownership
rate, because across households in the sample age has a slight positive correlation with likelihood of
ownership in the NLSY sample (4.5% in 2003 and 2% in 2007).
12
We use the FHFA all-transactions house price index, which is based on sales as well as appraisals
for refinance. The reason is that the purchase-only index is available only for the 100 largest MSAs
and at state level, whereas the all-transaction is available for all MSAs as well as for non-MSA parts of
the states. Results were found to be robust to substituting the purchase-only index where available.
.
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2006 and declined more sharply thereafter. Figure 3 shows how the change in the FHFA
index is distributed across MSAs for the two periods 2000 to 2003 and 2004 to 2007.

4.

Methodology
Following an established methodology in the literature, we jointly estimate a (first-stage)

selection equation identifying homeowner households that are not subject to borrowing
constraints, and a (second-stage) housing demand equation indicating the preferred home
value of these unconstrained, owner households. We then apply the estimated, target home
value equation to the entire (renter and owner) recent mover population to distinguish
borrowing constrained households. In essence, this approach assumes that a household that is
relocating and considering ownership, if not financing constrained, would demand the same
value home as a similarly situated, unconstrained owner household in the general population.
Three conditions must be satisfied for a household to be considered unconstrained. First,
their wealth must exceed 5% of their targeted house value, implying an ability to make a 5
percent down payment. Second, the mortgage payment associated with borrowing 95 percent
of the targeted house value, given the prevailing market interest rate13 for a fixed-rate
mortgage plus the typical premium for private mortgage insurance, must not exceed 28% of
their monthly income, implying ability to meet the traditional, standard requirement for prime
mortgage credit. We also consider alternative thresholds of higher down payment and
payment-to-income ratios for robustness including 10% down payment and 33% payment-toincome. Third, they must have favorable credit records with respect to having none of the
following risk indicators: a credit line that is fully drawn, a credit request refusal in the last 5
years, or bankruptcy in the last 9 years; and they are not “thin file”, meaning they have
current or previous credit utilization. These are important indicators of consumer credit risk
and major components of the consumer’s credit score, which is driven by length of credit
history, past delinquencies, amount owed and utilization.14 Note that although we do not
have actual mortgage terms in the data, the intention of defining constraints under traditional
standards is to capture whether alternative products and risk based pricing have relaxed the
traditional constraints, that is, whether the probability of homeownership has increased and
the impact of the traditional constraints has lessened with the growth of alternative products
and risk based pricing.
The housing demand equation is estimated within the group of unconstrained

13

The interest rate is the minimum weekly Primary Mortgage Market Survey rate for 2003 (5.21%)
and 2007 (5.96 %.) from http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms_archives.html.
14
See Calem et al. 2010 for further discussion of the measurement of credit quality.
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homeowners and relates a household’s home value to household income, demographic
variables, and geographic location.15 Unconstrained homeowners are those whose home
value, wealth, and income satisfy the specified thresholds, and who have good credit. As
membership in this group is not a random event, we control for sample selection by applying
the Heckman two-step selection equation. Accordingly, we first estimate an equation for
probability of being an unconstrained homeowner, from which we obtain an adjustment for
sample selection that is applied in our housing demand equation.
We follow Calem et al. (2010) in constructing the specification for the jointly estimated
selection model and unconstrained housing demand model, equations (1). The same variables
are used in both equations since we did not find predictors of unconstrained homeowners not
related to the house value.16

(1)

After applying the estimated housing demand equation to distinguish constrained from
unconstrained households for the full population of owners and renters, we estimate a probit
model of homeownership likelihood in relation to the borrowing constraints, equation (2). As
noted earlier, the probit model estimation is restricted to households that were recent movers,
as their tenure decision is a direct outcome of the move.

(2)

Controls include race, marital status, whether the respondent has children, and the
respondent’s education level.
The models are estimated for both 2003 and 2007 in order to assess changes associated
with the housing market boom during the interim period. In addition to exploring the direct
relationship between homeownership outcomes and borrowing constraints at the beginning

15

US Census region is the most disaggregated geographic information generally available to the public
from the NLSY data. For this study, we obtained access to the confidential MSA-level geographic
identifier; such access is granted to academic institutions subject to certain qualifications.
16
See, for example, Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1996) for discussion of the bivariate probit
model in a housing demand and tenure choice context. With bivariate probit, identification is possible
even with a common set of explanatory variables due to the non-linearity of the probit model.
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and end of the boom period, we look at tenure choice in relation to local house price
appreciation and, in an alternative specification, in relation to value-to-rent ratios. The rapid
rise in home values in many regions that characterized the boom period between 2003 and
2007 may have positively influenced homeownership through the impact on households’
expected asset returns from ownership, since housing is both an investment and consumption
good. At the same time, rapidly rising house prices or value-to-rent ratios could generate
concerns about overpricing and imminent declines in value or could affect homeownership
outcomes directly through the relative costs of renting versus owning or indirectly through
their impact on borrowing constraints or on other aspects of affordability.

5.

Results
We first report the results, in Table 3, from the two-equation model (1) of housing

demand of unconstrained owner households. This model determines a household’s preferred
(target) house price in the absence of borrowing constraints, in relation to household location
and demographic characteristics.17 The model is estimated on the entire homeowner
population, consisting of 6,130 observations in 2003 and 6,084 observations in 2007.
From the house price equation we see that in both years, the regions that comprise the
East, West, and South Central regions in the US are associated with lower house prices and
the three large MSAs, Boston, New York, and Washington DC are associated with higher
house prices. Larger families are associated with higher house values, but controlling for
household size, marital status is associated with a lower house value.18
Table 4 reports the percentages of borrowing constrained households among recent
movers, by sample period and by type of borrowing constraint, using the traditional
measures. We compare the percent constrained by wealth, income, credit, or all constraints
combined in 2007 relative to 2003. More recent movers were wealth constrained in 2007
(52%) than in 2003 (44%). There is a similar increase in the percent income constrained. The
percent that are indicated to be credit constrained increases slightly. The percent with at least
one constraint and all three constraints also increases between 2003 and 2007, based on the
17

The same set of variables is used in the house price and the unconstrained household selection
equations, as in Calem et al. (2010). Some demographic variables that were used are not reported in
Table 3 for the sake of brevity, as they were not statistically significant in either equation.
18
We find that the impact of marital status on preferred house value is more weakly negative
(estimated coefficient of -0.14) and offset by the relationship to household size when the housing
demand equation is estimated for the full homeowner population (both financially constrained and
unconstrained.) A possible explanation for the large, negative relationship of married status for
unconstrained households is that unmarried households in this age cohort have a strong preference for
residing in central city locations.
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traditional measures.19 We note a high correlation between the income and wealth constraints
of close to 40% and only around 10% correlation between being credit constrained and each
of the other two.
The substantial increase in the proportion of recent movers that are wealth and income
constrained using traditional measures is likely tied to the rise in house prices in this period.
That rising prices will cause income constraints to be more binding on a household seeking to
relocate is clear; however, the impact on wealth constraints is more nuanced. Whereas house
price appreciation provides a wealth benefit to homeowners seeking to relocate from areas
with rapidly increasing prices to those with slower price appreciation, those relocating in the
other direction will be increasingly wealth constrained according to the traditional criterion.
Likewise, owners seeking to “trade-up” into a higher-priced home, along with renters, may
increasingly be wealth constrained as a result of rising house prices. Thus, a plausible
explanation for the increase in proportion of wealth constrained households among recent
movers is that the latter effects of rising prices were predominant. Note that less restrictive
underwriting would not affect the proportion constrained by these measures, which assume
traditional underwriting. However, less restrictive underwriting should be reflected in a
weaker impact of the financing constraints on homeownership in the estimation of the probit
model.

a. Probit Model
Tables 5 and 6 report the estimation results for probability of homeownership in relation
to the three borrowing constraint indicators. Table 5 provides estimated coefficients and
standard errors and Table 6 reports the marginal effects corresponding to the results in Table
5, for four specifications. Model A1 (column 1) omits the housing market variables, while
models A2 and A3 (columns 2 and 3) include the change in HPI and the value-to-rent ratio
respectively and model A4 include both variables (column 4).
Across all four specifications, we see a substantial decrease in the effect of income and
credit constraints between 2003 and 2007. In 2007 we no longer see coefficients that are
significantly different from zero for income and credit constraints. The wealth constraint
effect also declines in magnitude, although it is still significant and negative. In 2003 all
constraints have a significant negative sign with the wealth constraint having the largest
effect followed by income and credit. In 2007, only the wealth constraint remains statistically
significant.
19

The percent non-constrained, although higher for homeowners in both years, decreases more for
owners than for renters.
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The weakened impact of credit constraints is consistent with less restrictive underwriting
that broadened availability of credit to borrowers with weaker credit records, and thus is
consistent with expansion of subprime lending during this period. Subprime credit also may
have contributed to weakened income constraints by de-emphasizing traditional payment-toincome ratio requirements.

In addition, the weakened impact of income constraints is

consistent with expanded supply of non-traditional products that offered deferred repayment
of principal or interest, including interest only mortgages, pay-option adjustable rate
mortgages, and ARMs with introductory “teaser” interest rates.
The persistent impact of wealth constraints is somewhat unexpected given the growth in
high-LTV borrowing during this period in the form of simultaneous first and second liens
(“piggyback loans”), as documented by Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006, 2007). Many
such piggybacks had a combined LTV of 100 percent, typically split between an 80 percent
first lien and 20 percent second (so-called 80-20’s). One would expect the expansion of
piggyback lending to have made wealth constraints less binding. Nonetheless rising house
prices could counteract the impact of this expansion of piggyback lending on the impact of
wealth constraints. In our discussion subsection below, we provide some interpretations of
the observed persistence of wealth constraints within this context.
Table 5 also shows a statistically significant negative association between
homeownership and the value-to-rent ratio (model A3) for both 2003 and 2007, with a similar
magnitude in both years. This result is consistent with the literature that links value-to-rent
ratios to the relative cost of homeownership or it could reflect expected mean reversion of
housing prices. House price appreciation over the past three years is negatively associated
with homeownership in 2003 but insignificant in 2007 and is insignificant in both years when
value-to-rent is included (model A4).
Other variables included in the regressions as controls also show shifting coefficients
across these two periods. Of greatest interest perhaps are the rising negative coefficients for
minority status. Over this period minorities become less likely to choose homeownership, all
else equal. This may be due to omitted variables in the measurement of constraints across
race and ethnicity, magnified by rising house prices.
We estimate the tenure choice equation for both years with interactions of the constraint variables
with an indicator for African-American households and we separately estimate the tenure choice
equation for African-American households. We do not observe any material differences in the impact
of constraints across race categories over time. However, the coefficient on the wealth constraint
variable is larger for both years for African-American households.
20

20

We also replicated the base model using SCF data. Without geography we find it is difficult to
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b. Model Extensions
We re-estimate these equations under a variety of alternative assumptions. We begin by
varying the down payment and payment-to-income ratios that respectively define the wealth
and income constraints in Table 7. The results are robust to alternative, a wealth constraint
threshold of 10 percent down payment. The results are also robust to an alternative income
constraint threshold of 30 and 33 percent payment-to-income ratios. 21
We also combine all three of our constraints and compare the response of recent movers
to whether they are constrained by any of the three between 2003 and 2007. These results are
shown in Table 8 for three specifications. We find that the status of being constrained by any
of the measured constraints decreases the probability of homeownership in both periods, and,
although the coefficient on the constraint decreases in size, this decline is not statistically
significant. Results are robust to alternative models with interactions on the constraint. 22
In addition, because preferences and other unobserved factors may vary significantly
between recent movers that were previously owners and those that were previously renters,
we repeat the baseline analysis separately for these two cohorts. Results are reported in Table
9. The estimated relationships are similar across the two cohorts and align with those
observed for the combined population. One difference, however, when the regressions are
estimated by cohort, is that the coefficient of value-to-rent ratio is larger in absolute value for
previous renters and statistically significant only for this cohort. This may reflect a stronger
revealed preference for ownership among previous owners which causes them to be less
sensitive to changes in the relative cost of owning to renting as measured by this ratio.
These results may be biased due to sample selection. For example, there may be biases in
the 2007 sample if the movers included in the 2003 estimates are removed for 2007 - if
perhaps, those that could move, did, under more-constrained criteria in 2003, while those that
could not move in 2003, but could move, and did, under less-constrained conditions in 2007.
The controls in the model should account for a portion of this, but there remains a possibility
of unknown characteristics that make the 2003 and 2007 samples different. We test for
possible selection bias associated with recent movers by estimating a Heckman bivariate
probit model for which the first stage estimates the likelihood of moving and the second stage
identify target house values, thus, although the results (which are available from the authors) are
supportive of the findings here, we do not include them.
21
We also replicate the instrumental variable models used in Calem et al. (2010), using instruments for
income and wealth to define the income and wealth constraints. The decrease in the impact of the
credit constraint between 2007 and 2003 remains the same.
22
In one model we control for “only income constrained”, “only credit constrained”, “income or
wealth constraint” and “all other constrained.” In the other we control for each of the constraints
individually and with interactions of credit with wealth and credit with income.
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predicts the likelihood of homeownership likelihood. The estimated relationships of
ownership status to the constraint indicators for both years are essentially unchanged. 23
Finally, we test for whether the impact of credit constraints varies with housing market
conditions by including interaction of the constraint indicators with an indicator of significant
house price increase. We apply the 80th percentile of three-year house price appreciation to
distinguish high appreciation areas, as well as alternative thresholds.24 We do this to test for
whether greater relaxation of borrowing constraints is associated with high-appreciation
areas. Tables 10 and 11 show results for three alternative specifications (models B1, B2, and
B3) analogous to models A1, A2, and A3 in Tables 5 and 6, distinguished by choice of
variable to measure housing market conditions. Table 10 provides estimated coefficients and
standard errors and Table 11 reports the marginal effects corresponding to the results in Table
10.
We find that the credit quality constraint does not have a significant impact on
homeownership in areas with high rates of house price appreciation in 2003, and by 2007,
this variable is not statistically significant in either price appreciation category. The declining
impact of the income constraint and relatively stability of the wealth constraint appears to be
robust across the two price appreciation categories. We also interact constraints with the
value-to-rent ratio with similar results.
These findings are broadly consistent with the earlier results without interaction terms.
However, the interaction effects for the credit quality constraint may provide some additional
insight on evolution of lending practices in this period as discussed below.

c. Discussion
Overall, the model and its extensions establish the persistent significant impact of the
wealth constraint and the declining impact of income and credit quality constraints during the
bubble years. These findings are consistent with relaxation of credit standards between 2003
and 2007, along with the expanded supply of subprime, alt A, and other non-traditional credit
products. These may have largely eliminated income and credit barriers affecting households’

23

The first stage, mover equation includes the same explanatory variables as the homeownership
equation plus a few others: prior ownership status (ownership status as of the 2002 and 2006 waves of
the survey for the 2003 and 2007 samples, respectively); an indicator for having moved in the prior
two years (during 2000-2001 for the 2003 sample, and during 2004-2005 for the 2007 sample); and an
indicator for divorce. Estimation output from the bivariate probit estimation is available from the
authors on request.
24
We report only results based on the 80 th percentile threshold. We also applied a 25% increase in
prices as the threshold (which corresponds to the 80 th percentile in the 2000 to 2003 period), and
obtained similar findings.
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ability to finance the purchase of a target valued home.
Despite the measured decreasing impact of credit quality and income constraints,
homeownership does not increase when comparing recent movers in 2003 to recent movers in
2007. In fact, there is a slight decrease in homeownership among movers, as in the general
population over this period. The decline in homeownership in our sample may be explained
by the increase in the percent who are constrained; the persistent impact of the wealth
constraint; and the rising value-to-rent ratio.
The fact that the wealth constraint holds while the credit and income constraints weaken
is consistent with lenders relying on collateral while easing other underwriting criteria. This
result is agnostic as to whether rising house prices enabled greater reliance on collateral or
whether relaxed credit constraints contributed to rising prices.
Even with greater reliance by lenders on collateral when easing other underwriting
criteria, the persistence of the wealth constraint may seem surprising, since during this period
as we have noted earlier, high-LTV “piggyback” lending, up to 100 percent combined LTV,
became increasingly common.25 Nevertheless, we can think of several additional reasons
why the wealth constraint could remain binding. First, as described by Avery, Brevoort, and
Canner (2006, 2007), a substantial proportion of the piggyback loans originated during this
period were merely replacing first-lien loans with mortgage insurance which for many years
had been a source of high-LTV financing. The piggybacks gained popularity as a lower cost
(lower monthly payment) alternative to mortgage insurance, and as such would have
contributed to reducing income constraints but not wealth constraints. Second, a substantial
proportion of piggybacks were originated in the subprime market, expanding the availability
of subprime credit, and thus helping to ease income and credit constraints. Third, even with
100 percent financing of the purchase price there still would be closing costs, moving costs,
and fix-up costs for which the borrower would need disposable wealth.
Moreover, mitigating effects of piggyback lending on wealth constraints could have been
offset by exacerbating effects of rapidly rising house prices. Such exacerbating factors
include higher costs of a high LTV loan (which, in the case of a first and second lien would
have a relatively high blended rate due to risk-based pricing. In addition, in an environment
of rapidly appreciating house values, the asking price for the home might be higher than the
appraised value, used to underwrite the loan, requiring the borrower to come up with the cash
to close this “appraisal gap.” Indeed, one might conclude that the surprising finding is not
continued persistence of wealth constraints, but the banishment of income constraints despite
25

Some non-regulated non depository institutions did make second liens available which raised the
CLTV up to 125% but such loans were not generally available and did not become common.
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the rapid house price appreciation, which attests to the effectiveness of alternative mortgage
products and less restrictive underwriting standards in mitigating income constraints.
We cannot identify the extent to which each of these potential mechanisms contributed to
persistent wealth constraints. Nonetheless, this constraint holds and discourages
homeownership in 2003 and in the height of the bubble in 2007. Even with risk based pricing
eliminating the impact of credit and income constraints, it does not appear that the shift to
risk based pricing eliminates the impact of a collateral based wealth constraint. This
constraint on homeownership remains binding in a period of risk based pricing and less
restrictive underwriting conditions. This result combined with the rise in the value-to-rent
ratio can help to explain the decline in homeownership that occurred in these years.
Our results also shed some light on the association between house price appreciation and
relaxation of borrowing constraints. In the 2003 sample, subprime credit appears to have
been more readily available where collateral values were appreciating while by 2007 we
observe a general removal of credit quality and income constraints to homeownership that
appears to be independent of geography and local price appreciation dynamics. However, we
do not observe an association between house price appreciation and the impact of income
constraints in 2003. This is consistent with the rapid growth of alt-A, interest only, and other
nontraditional mortgage products aimed at increased affordability, only after 2003.
As of 2007, we observe a general removal of credit quality and income constraints
independent of geography or areas of relatively high price appreciation. This suggests that
marginal impacts of local house price appreciation on credit supply had a secondary impact
during the bubble years, consistent with broad expansion of mortgage credit independent of
geography. 26

6.

Conclusions
This paper examines the evolution of borrowing constraints during the 2003 to 2007

period of rapidly rising house values, using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY). Use of the NLSY sample focuses the analysis on households in their 40s,
excluding young individuals and immigrants. However, we do not view this as a significant
drawback because our focus is on the evolving impact of borrowing constraints over the
boom period and their interaction with local housing market conditions, which we expect
would be similar for other demographic groups. Moreover, the NLSY sample of individuals

26

One possible explanation is the predominance of rapid house price growth during this period
combined with the fact that mortgages from weaker housing markets could be packaged into MBS
together with mortgages from markets with strong house price appreciation.
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is likely less financially constrained than the excluded household categories, so any impact of
constraints could be larger for the broader population.
Consistent with prior studies, the three constraint categories income, wealth, and credit
quality are associated with reduced likelihood of homeownership among the recent movers in
the 2003 wave of the NLSY, but only the impact of the wealth constraint persists in 2007.
These findings suggest that easing of lending standards during the boom period had a
mitigating impact on income, and credit quality constraints to homeownership but not on the
wealth constraint. Higher prices interacted with less strict underwriting standards so that
wealth constraints were still an obstacle to homeownership.
Persistence of the wealth constraint may help explain why the homeownership rate
declined during the boom period. The general increase in the proportion of borrowing
constrained households consequent to rising house prices and the rise in the value-to-rent
ratio could have further curtailed homeownership.
In the 2003 sample, we observe easing of the credit quality constraint in areas with
relatively rapid house price appreciation, consistent with other studies that have found an
association between rising house prices and less restrictive underwriting. As of 2007, we
observe a general removal of credit quality and income constraints independent of geography,
consistent with broad expansion of subprime and non-traditional mortgage credit.
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Table 1: Variables Description
Variable

Definition

Source

Log Income

log of total family income in last calendar year: 2003: r8496100, 2008: t2210000

NLSY

Log Family Size

family size: 2004: r8496000, 2008: t2209900

NLSY

Married

marital status : 2204: r8496600, 2008: t2210400

NLSY

Black

race of respondent: r0810100

NLSY

Hispanic

ethnicity of respondent : r7093000

NLSY

Log Grade
Attained

log of highest grade completed by respondent: 2004: r8497000, 2008: t2210700

NLSY

Kids

there are children in household : 2004: R8504300, 2008: T2217800

NLSY

respondent currently resides in a Metropolitan Statistical Area: 2004: R8498700, 2008: T2212300
regional division as defined by the US census: California or Hawaii, Pacific (Alaska, Oregon,
Washington), East North Central, East South Central, Mid Atlantic, Mountain, New England, South
Atlantic Region, West North Central, West South Central

NLSY

Metropolitan Statistical Areas in which the respondent resides: Boston, New York, Washington DC

NLSY

Household
Characteristics

Location
In MSA
Regions
MSAs

US Census

Market Values
Change HPI
Value to Rent
incr HPI
non-incr HPI

percent change in the FHFA house price index for the MSA or state in which the respondent resides as
of 2004 or 2008, using FHFA all- transaction indexes for MSAs and state non metropolitan areas.
median house value divided by the median annual rent for the MSA or state in which the respondent
resides
MSA whose house price increase during the period ( 2000-2003 and 2004-2007) place them above the
80th percentile of the distribution according to FHFA House price Index
MSA whose house price increase during the period (2000-2003 and 2004-2007) place them below the
80th percentile of the distribution according to FHFA House Price Index or non –MSA areas

FHFA
US Census
(ACS)
NLSY
NLSY

Constraints
Wealth
Constraint
Income
Constraint

Credit Constraint
Income Constr*
incr HPI
Income Constr*
non-incr HPI
Wealth Constr*
incr HPI
Wealth Constr*
non-incr HPI
Credit*
incr HPI
Credit*
non-incr HPI

respondents whose wealth is inferior to 5% of their optimal house value

NLSY

respondents who would have to spend more than 28% of their annual income on a mortgage
corresponding to 95% of their optimal house value based on minimal weekly interest rates from Freddie
Mac Primary Mortgage Market.
respondents who are deemed to have high credit risk because of a credit line that is fully drawn (2004:
r8417600, 2008: t2181900); a credit request refusal in the last 5 years (2004: r8418300, 2008:
t2182301); or bankruptcy in the last 9 years (2004: r8418001, 2008: t2182301). Or who are considered
as thin- file because they do not report previous credit utilization.

NLSY,
Freddie
Mac

interaction of the income constraint and increasing HPI variables
interaction of the income constraint and non -increasing HPI variables
interaction of the wealth constraint and increasing HPI variables
interaction of the wealth constraint and non -increasing HPI variables
interaction of the credit constraint and increasing HPI variables
interaction of the credit constraint and non-increasing HPI variables

NLSY

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Entire Population and Recent Movers)
Mean
(Entire Population)

Variables
Respondent Age

Black (%)

Hispanic (%)

In MSA (%)

Highest Grade

Married (%)

Kids (%)

Family Size

Log Family Income

Wealth

Mean
(Recent Movers)

2003

2007

2003

2007

All

43.34

46.82

43.12

46.66

Owners

43.41

46.86

43.20

46.61

Renters

43.15

46.72

43.06

46.69

All

13.36

13.30

17.38

20.70

Owners

8.85

8.55

9.57

10.46

Renters

24.70

26.04

24.28

27.16

All

6.46

6.26

7.47

7.55

Owners

5.51

5.23

6.78

5.73

Renters

8.84

9.00

8.08

8.70

All

79.03

91.71

81.00

94.15

Owners

78.20

91.07

79.22

92.11

Renters

81.11

93.43

82.57

95.43

All

13.57

13.71

13.26

13.19

Owners

13.93

14.03

13.96

13.83

Renters

12.68

12.85

12.64

12.78

All

63.30

61.53

45.46

37.86

Owners

77.53

74.86

68.34

60.66

Renters

27.52

25.82

25.26

23.46

All

64.67

57.69

52.53

43.33

Owners

73.23

65.10

63.60

53.02

Renters

43.15

37.87

42.76

37.22

All

3.10

2.87

2.65

2.37

Owners

3.35

3.07

3.01

2.65

Renters

2.49

2.34

2.33

2.20

All

10.89

10.98

10.57

10.45

Owners

11.16

11.25

11.14

11.00

Renters

10.14

10.19

10.04

10.08

All

251,822

350,557

175,342

167,299

Owners

338,303

462,566

337,632

352,292

Renters

34,402

50,477

32,122

50,535

Home Value

Owners

231,072

280,530

264,737

265,351

Home Owner (%)

All

71.54

72.82

46.88

38.69

Credit Constraint (%)

All

20.91

20.90

27.93

30.29

Owners

16.40

16.18

20.09

23.40

Renters

32.26

33.52

34.85

34.64

Observation

All

7,132

7,084

1,962

1,591

Owners

4,567

4,597

778

508

Renters

2,565

2,487

1,184

1,083

